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REASONABLE REGARD: A SOLUTION TO THE LIGNITE PROBLEM
Although strip mining in Louisiana once seemed a remote
possibility, the nation's need for new energy sources has necessitated
development of the lignite deposits here.2 Since land often is burdened
with separate oil and coal leases, operations of one mineral producer
are likely to hinder, if not preclude, the operations of another.' Thus
significant conflicts may develop. For example, strip mining for lignite
totally destroys the surface, thereby precluding production of oil
because a certain portion of the surface is required for drilling opera-
tions. Each developer would like exclusive control of the surface to
conduct his operations, but this is often impractical. Therefore, a way
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal recognized this fact in River
Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minn., 331 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976), in which it held that the particular mineral lease involved did not permit strip
mining for lignite. The court based its decision on the fact that "[wIhile the existence
of the coal deposits may have been known when the instant lease was executed, no
one then considered it economically feasible to extract it." Id. at 880. At that time,
Louisiana had an abundance of gas and oil, which overshadowed any possibility of
lignite being used as a fuel. However, in the early 1970s rising energy costs and short-
ages resulted in a reappraisal by the energy industry of the economic feasibility of
mining the lignite deposits in northern Louisiana. The court of appeal in Continental
Group, Inc. v. Allison, 379 So. 2d 1117, 1126 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981), stated that "[i]nterest in the lignite deposits became
dormant when oil and gas production became abundant in Louisiana but revived in
the 1970s when domestic production of oil and gas substantially failed to meet the
nation's need for energy."
2. There are significant deposits of lignite in DeSoto, Red River, Natchitoches,
and Bienville parishes, and initial development will take place in these areas. Lignite
is of the lowest rank of coals, being a brown substance intermediate between peat
and bituminous coal. The name is derived from ligum, the Latin word for wood, because
the texture of the original wood is often discernible in the coal. WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 665 (8th ed. 1976).
3. The contrasts to oil and gas development should be noted: lignite cannot be
mined in piecemeal fashion-it must be developed sequentially or it may not be
economical to mine it at all; oil and gas underlying a large area can be produced
with very small disturbance to the surface-lignite mining occupies all of the
surface; oil and gas may be transported long distances before use, and a vast
market exists for the substances-lignite will probably not be moved very far
from its point of development, and it is difficult to say that it has a market value
apart from the single plant near the field built to utilize that particular sort of
lignite; and a number of producers of oil or gas may operate in a single reservoir
or field or even have separate rights as to different strata underlying the same
tract of land-lignite development in one field by more than one producer is not
very feasible.
P. MARTIN, CONTINUOUS REVISION COMMITTEE FOR THE MINERAL CODE, LA. STATE LAW
INSTITUTE, REPORT: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS RELATING TO LIGNITE DEVELOPMENT 1 (1981).
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for the two competing mineral interests to coexist peacefully must
be found so the nation's call for maximum development of natural
resources can be answered.
The Louisiana Mineral Code furnishes a formula for resolving the
controversies that inevitably arise between the lignite producer and
the oil and gas producer. Articles 114 and 22' of the Mineral Code
recognize the respective rights of owners of different rights in land.6
These two articles embody a standard of reasonableness that is used
to determine whether landowners or mineral interest owners have
exercised their rights in a tract of land with reasonable regard for
the other interests therein. That standard of reasonableness is referred
to as "reasonable regard." This note will discuss how Louisiana applies
the standard of reasonable regard,7 how that standard compares with the
standard of "due regard,"' and how these two standards compare with
the doctrine of accommodation of the surface owner.9 In addition, poten-
tial areas of conflict between oil producers and lignite producers will be
discussed, as well as how these problems should be resolved.
History
Although there have been no recent cases in other jurisdictions
dealing with conflicts between competing mineral interests, a few older
4. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:11 (1974 & Supp. 1982) states:
The owner of land burdened by a mineral right or rights and the owner of a
mineral right must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for
those of the other. Similarly the owners of separate mineral rights in the same
land must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for the right
of other owners.
5. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:22 (1974) states:
The owner of a mineral servitude is under no obligation to exercise it. If he does,
he is entitled to use only so much of the land as is reasonably necessary to con-
duct his operations. He is obligated, insofar as practicable, to restore the surface
to its original condition at the earliest reasonable time.
6. In most cases mineral lessees will be the parties involved in conflicts; however,
article ll's standard of reasonable regard applies to all owners of the right to produce
and develop particular minerals.
7. See Morgan, Correlative Rights: Surface Owner vs. Mineral Owner, 26 INST.
ON MIN. L. 141 (1979), for a discussion of article 11 of the Mineral Code and the stan-
dard of reasonable regard.
8. See Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and
Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1980), for a discussion of the standard of due
regard as applied in other states.
9. See Broyles, Oil and Gas Producers v. Coal Producers: Planning Impacts of
a Developing Judicial Policy, 15 FORUM 481 (1980); see also Note, The Surface Mineral
Producer v. the Oil and Gas Producer: A Need for Peaceful Coexistence, 29 BAYLOR L.
REV. 907 (1977); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 16 (1973).
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cases do address the question. In Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon,"0
the leading case in balancing the rights of competing mineral users,
a coal producer sought an injunction to 'protect his coal mine from
the dangers posed by an oil well being drilled in the same area. The
court said the owner of the right to drill for oil had, by necessity,
a right of way through the coal to reach the oil. That right of way,
however, had to be exercised with due regard for the interests and
rights of both parties. The principle espoused by Chartiers is that
one with an interest in the underlying strata should not be permitted
at his mere whim to interfere with the land above his interest." The
Pennsylvania court recognized that the original mineral lease was for
a limited purpose and that the subsequent lease of the same area for
different mineral interests did not lessen either lessee's right to exploit
his interest.
The first Louisiana case to address the issue of lignite produc-
tion's infringement on surface rights was Continental Group, Inc. v.
Allison," in which several noncontiguous tracts of land were purchased
by a timber producer, subject to a reservation of all mineral rights.
Continental Group succeeded the timber company as purchaser of the
land and sought a declaratory judgment that the mineral reservation
included only the right to develop oil and gas and did not include
the right to produce solid minerals. The Louisiana Supreme Court,
on rehearing, held that the original parties' negotiations evidenced
their intent to include in the reservation the right to strip mine lignite,
but this right had prescribed by nonuse. In its original opinion, the
Louisiana Supreme Court approved 3 the second circuit's holding that
strip mining did not permit lignite producers to exercise their rights
"arbitrarily or devastatingly or without due regard for the rights of
the landowner."" This position was not affected by the rehearing. Thus
the supreme court recognized that concurrent users of land have cor-
relative rights.
Louisiana's Standard of Reasonable Regard
The respective rights of the lessor and the lessee are determined
by the lease." The lease may specify that the mineral lessee has com-
10. 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893).
11. See Telford v. Jenning Producing Co., 203 F. 456 (7th Cir. 1913); Pyramid Coal
Corp. v. Pratt, 229 Ind. 648, 99 N.E.2d 427 (1951); Pennsylvania Cent. Brewing Co.
v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250 Pa. 300, 95 A. 471 (1915); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1964).
12. 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981), rev'g on other grounds 379 So. 2d 1117 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1979).
13. 404 So. 2d at 433.
14. 379 So. 2d 1117, 1130 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
15. See Odom v. Union Producing Co. of La., 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962);
Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 183 La. 287, 163 So. 103 (1935).
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plete control and exclusive use of the surface.16 If the lease is silent
as to the respective rights of the lessor and the lessee, the two par-
ties are required by law to proceed with reasonable regard for one
another so that the land and resources are developed to maximum
potential." After Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, article 11 of the
Mineral Code, which originally dealt with correlative rights of land-
owners and mineral right owners, was amended."5 The article now
specifies that not only are landowners and single mineral right owners
required to exercise reasonable regard for the rights of each other
but the owners of different mineral interests in a tract of land also
are required to exercise their rights with reasonable regard for each
other. Thus, even though no contractual duties may exist between
16. The law governing relationships between private parties has little concern
with such competing uses where the parties themselves agree to the modes of
use and restriction on use. Thus where the landowner agrees with the owner
of the right to produce lignite that the lignite owner may come on the land and
strip mine it, the law need not concern itself with the landowner's desire to raise
a crop; the landowner has given up that right. Where, however, the parties have
been silent or inexplicit and it is a matter of doubt and ambiguity as to what
rights were granted and what rights were retained, it would appear preferable
for the law to seek to restrict the utilization of the property by either party
as little as possible. The principle stated here is affected by the issue of priority
of right. Thus if one party acquires from a landowner the right to produce oil
and gas from the land and a second party later acquires from the landowner the
right to produce lignite from the same land, it may fairly be said that the lignite
right owner took his interest subject to the rights of the oil and gas developer,
and certainly the lignite owner could not exclude the oil and gas owner from
developing his interest. Yet, the question remains as to the extent of the oil and
gas owner's rights. If his agreement had expressly provided that no other use
could be made of the land that might interfere with any plan of operations he
might have, then the lignite right owner might be excluded entirely from the
land. Such an agreement, however, would be atypical of the expectations of most
parties who undertake mineral transactions. Thus the oil and gas developer who
takes a lease from a farmer would be expected not to interfere unduly with the
landowner's farming or cattle. Likewise, a lessee of the land who leased for farm-
ing and cattle grazing subsequent to the oil and gas lease would be subject to
the reasonable operations of the oil and gas lessee but he should also expect to
be able to conduct farming and grazing with minimal interference from the oil
and gas lessee despite the priority of right. So, too, would it be with the owners
of different rights in minerals.
P. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 5.
17. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:11 (1974 & Supp. 1982). For a discussion of the
correlative rights of landowners and mineral lessees in Louisiana, see Hall, Priorities
and Liabilities for Using the Lease Premises: the Oil Operator and Concurrent Users,
18 INST. ON MIN. L. 3 (1971); Comment, Concurrent Right to Surface Use in Conjunc-
tion with Oil and Gas Development in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 655 (1973).
18. 1982 La. Acts, No. 780, S 1.
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the two competing mineral lessees, article 11 imposes mutual duties
on them."
Reasonable regard is the standard to apply in Louisiana when
development of a party's mineral interest infringes upon the rights
of another with a mineral interest in the land." Determining what
is reasonable conduct is a question of fact, even though "reasonable-
ness" is such a broad term that it provides little or no guidance to
lessees in determining how to conduct their operation. The comment
to article 11 expressly states that its standard is not intended to sug-
gest that the rights and obligations of the parties must always be
based on negligence.2 In evaluating the reasonableness of a party's
conduct, courts employ a balancing process in which all circumstances
are examined. Their primary concern should be to encourage and pro-
19. Other jurisdictions have sought to provide standards that encourage peaceful
coexistence of mineral lessees and multiple use of the land. For example, North Dakota's
policy is to foster, encourage, and promote the development, production, and utiliza-
tion of all natural resources in a manner that will prevent waste and allow a greater
ultimate recovery. N.D. CENT. CODE S 38-15-01 (1980). North Dakota enacted a statute,
id. S 38-15-03, to effectuate this policy and aid in resolving conflicts between subsur-
face mineral producers, and this statute should be adopted in other states as well.
The North Dakota statute empowers its industrial commission to make any rule or
regulation necessary to enforce the policy.
Federal law, 30 U.S.C. SS 521-530 (1976), also urges the multiple use of land so
that the land is developed to its maximum potential. Section 526 of title 30 provides
that where the same lands are being used for mining operations and drilling opera-
tions, each such operation shall be conducted, so far as reasonably practicable, in a
manner compatible with other intended uses. Mining and drilling operations on federal
lands shall be conducted in a manner which will not damage any known deposit of
fugacious minerals or any existing surface or underground mining operation. If one
operation cannot be reasonably and properly conducted without endangering or material-
ly interfering with existing drilling or mining operations, the courts may permit this
operation to proceed upon the operator's payment of fair compensation to the other
party. 30 U.S.C. S 526(D) (1976).
20. Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison is the only case which has cited article 11.
Because the court in this case did not specifically consider what the burden of proof
would be in cases applying the standard of reasonable regard, the burden of proof
in such cases is uncertain. However, the cases that reflect the Louisiana correlative
rights doctrine indicate that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's actions on the land were unreasonable or were conducted in a manner
that disregarded the rights of other users of the land. The burden of proof should
be the same in cases which apply the reasonable regard standard. See Voisin v. Berry
Bros., Inc., 387 So. 2d 633, 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Captain Kevin Corp. v. Bay
Drilling Corp., 380 So. 2d 639, 643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Jurisich v. Louisiana So.
Oil & Gas Co., 284 So. 2d 173, 178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Morgan, supra note 7, at 153.
21. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:11, comment (1974 & Supp. 1982); see Morgan,
supra note 7, at 155.
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mote the production of all natural resources in a manner that will
prevent waste and allow a greater ultimate recovery.
In determining, what constitutes reasonable conduct, Louisiana
courts can look for guidance to jurisprudence from analogous situa-
tions. In addition to article 11, the respective rights of concurrent
users of land are recognized in Mineral Code article 22, which states
that a mineral owner is entitled to use only so much of the land as
is reasonably necessary to conduct his operations." Both article 22
and article 11 mandate that parties act reasonably when there are
competing interests in the land. Since both articles embody a concept
of reasonableness, jurisprudence applying article 22 to resolve con-
flicts between different interests in land may indicate how similar con-
flicts should be resolved under article 11.
Louisiana courts have used article 22's standard to resolve disputes
between a mineral lessee and a surface user. For example, courts have
held that a mineral lessee may cut timber 23 or clear farmland in order
to establish a well site. 4 Moreover, construction of overflow pits,25
removal of fences, and seismic operations27 are considered proper con-
duct by a mineral lessee. In clearing a well site, however, the lessee
must minimize the destruction of fences and cut no more timber than
reasonably necessary. 8 The lessee is obligated, upon completion of
operations, to restore the premises to its former condition.29 There
is a clear indication in the jurisprudence of an attempt by the courts
22. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:22 (1974). In Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1953), a surface owner sued a mineral lessee for damages caused by drilling opera-
tions. The surface owner asked the mineral lessee to remove three oil tanks that interfered
with the plaintiffs intended improvements on his property. The Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal, holding for the surface owner, stated:
A mineral lessee, of course, has no right to extend his operations on the leased
premises beyond what is reasonably necessary to effectively produce minerals
under the terms of his contract. He should maintain and restore the premises
in the condition he found them subject to his rightful use, and where he has
damaged the land it is his duty to appropriately remedy the condition brought
on by his use of the lease. Except to this extent he has no right to interfere
with the surface owner's full enjoyment of his property.
Id. at 431-32.
23. Wemple v. Pasadena Petroleum Co., 147 La. 532, 85 So. 230 (1920).
24. See Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1958).
25. Id.; Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
26. Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
27. Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. La. 1966), af/cd,
387 F.2d 903, (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 400 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1968).
28. Wemple v. Pasadena Petroleum Co., 147 La. 532, 85 So. 230 (1920).
29. Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
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to balance the rights of owners of competing interests in land. While
article 22 has been applied principally between the landowner and
the mineral lessee, the reasonableness standard utilized therein
arguably is the same standard to be applied under article 11. Thus
the cases interpreting article 22 can be applied by analogy to resolve
disputes between competing mineral interests. A flexible standard of
reasonableness will allow the courts to render decisions encouraging
development of both interests.
The principle that concurrent and correlative rights to property
must be exercised so as not to unduly injure or damage the rights
of another" also has been propounded in Louisiana in cases involving
conflicts between oyster harvesting and oil production.' The mineral
lessee is entitled to dredge channels through oyster beds when it is
reasonably necessary for successful mineral operations.2 As long as
the dredging is conducted in a reasonable manner and is necessary,
no damages will be assessed." However, if the mineral lessee dredges
a channel through an oyster bed when he is aware of an alternative
site which would minimize damages, he is responsible for the loss
occasioned thereby.' Arguably, the principles derived from these cases
can be applied to conflicts between oil producers and lignite producers;
in both situations, two leased interests are competing for the use of
the surface. Oyster harvesting and lignite production require the com-
plete use of the surface. In producing oil, a certain amount of the
leasehold surface is required (although the oil lies thousands of feet
below). Thus, in both oyster harvesting and lignite production, con-
flict with the oil producer is inevitable. Louisiana courts have re-
30. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:11 (1974 & Supp. 1982); Collette v. Marine Ex-
ploration Co., 213 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. La. 1963); Voisin v. Berry Bros., Inc., 387 So.
2d 633 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Lauzon v. J.C. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc., 247
So. 2d 236 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
31. See Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1959); Vodopija v. Gulf Ref.
Co., 198 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1952); Collette v. Marine Exploration Co., 213 F. Supp. 609
(E.D. La. 1963); Doucet v. Texas Co., 205 La. 312, 17 So. 2d 340 (1944); Voisin v. Berry
Bros., Inc., 387 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Jurisich v. Louisiana So. Oil and
Gas Co., 284 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Lauzon v. J.C. Trahan Drilling Con-
tractor, Inc., 247 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
32. Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1959); Vodopija v. Gulf Ref. Co.,
198 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1952).
33. Vodopija v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 152 F. Supp. 14, 17 (E.D. La. 1957).
34. Lauzon v. J.C. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc., 247 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971).
35. These cases place very little emphasis on the prior recordation of a lease,
emphasizing instead the necessity that the lessees conduct their activities with regard
for the rights of others. Admittedly, the existence of multiple leases may result in
some inconvenience to the parties, but as public policy encourages the development
1983] 1245
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quired the oyster bed lessee and the oil lessee to conduct their opera-
tions in a manner reasonably calculated to respect the rights of the
other leased interest. Arguably, this same standard of reasonableness,
together with the duty to exercise reasonable regard, is imposed by
article 11 on oil and lignite producers competing for the use of the
surface. Indeed, the need for the development of energy resources
presents an even stronger reason for encouraging compatibility of
operations between concurrent users of land than does the conflicts
that arise between oyster harvesters and oil producers. Therefore,
the oyster cases can be looked to for guidance when resolving con-
flicts between oil producers and lignite producers.
In searching for standards of reasonableness that are applicable
to the mineral law, courts often attempt to apply the Civil Code
articles on predial servitudes. 6 In Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison,
both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the second circuit cited former
Civil Code articles 772-779 in support of the proposition that a mineral
interest owner must not exercise his rights in an arbitrary or
unreasonable manner.17 Although the comments to Mineral Code
articles admittedly are not the law, the comment to article 11
specifically states that former Civil Code articles 777-779 are not to
be applied when determining the correlative rights of concurrent users
of land. Mineral interests are of a special nature. They are not nor-
mal predial or personal servitudes as envisioned by the Civil Code.
Because of this distinction, mineral rights are treated as sui generis
under the Mineral Code. Since the drafters of the Civil Code could
not have foreseen the difficulties presented by conflicting mineral in-
terests, the Civil Code articles on predial servitudes should not be
applied to resolve conflicts between coexisting mineral lessees.
Perhaps the same argument can be made against the application
of Civil Code article 667 to resolve disputes between coexisting mineral
interest owners. However, this article has been applied to a mineral
lessee,38 and the article does provide some guidance in determining
of all mineral interests, the existence of a prior lease should not preclude a second
lessee from exploiting the affected land for mineral purposes. See Comment, Concurrent
Right to Surface Use in Conjunction with Oil and Gas Development in Louisiana, 33
LA. L. REV. 655, 664 n.47 (1973).
36. See Grayson v. Lyons, Prentiss, & McCord, 226 La. 462, 76 So. 2d 531 (1954);
Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 387 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981).
37. 404 So. 2d at 433; 379 So. 2d at 1128.
38. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919),
applied Civil Code article 667 to a situation in which a landowner left a well uncapped
to decrease the pumping efficiency of his neighbor's well. See also Adams v. Grigsby,
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what is reasonable conduct. Civil Code article 667 imposes upon
neighboring landowners reciprocal duties that limit the use of their
property; an owner must not seriously injure any right of his
neighbor." The article is a broad statement of law imposing liability
upon any person whose conduct infringes upon the rights of others
with economic interests in the land." Arguably, article 11 of the
Mineral Code imposes similar obligations on mineral interest owners
to conduct their operations in a reasonable manner so as not to serious-
ly injure the rights of other mineral interest owners in the property.
Therefore, Civil Code article 667 and the jurisprudence interpreting
that article should provide additional guidance when evaluating the
reasonableness of a party's conduct.
Accommodation of the Surface Owner
Other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of accommodation
of the surface owner to conflicts between concurrent users of land.
This doctrine, first espoused in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,"' is essentially
the same as the standard of reasonable regard. The doctrine requires
that where there are other usual, customary, and reasonable methods
practiced in the industry on similar lands put to similar uses and such
methods do not interfere with the existing uses of the surface owner,
these methods should be implemented."2 However, accommodation is
not synonymous with convenience; for example, convenience to the
surface owner is not controlling when there are no reasonable alter-
natives available to the mineral lessee."3 Nonetheless, if there is a
reasonable alternative, the mineral lessee must not employ interfering
methods or manners of use of the leasehold.
The Texas Supreme Court's adoption of the doctrine of accom-
modation in Getty Oil began a nationwide trend toward accommodating
the surface owner." The surface owner in Getty Oil had been using
152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La.
866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955).
39. See Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 245-46, 82 So.
206, 211 (1919); see also Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963);
Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935); Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights,
35 LA. L. REV. 965, 1005 (1975); Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework
of Vicinage: Articles 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REV. 195, 219 (1974).
40. See McCollam, Impact of Louisiana Mineral Code on Oil, Gas and Mineral Leases,
22 INST. ON MIN. L. 37, 79 (1975); see also Cueto-Rua, supra note 39, at 992.
41. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
42. Id. at 627-28.
43. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 137 (N.D. 1979).
44. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979), and Flying Dia-
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a self-propelled irrigation system prior to the commencement of the
mineral lessee's oil drilling operations. Two wells subsequently drilled
on the land were equipped with surface pumping units which
prevented the irrigation system from working. The court held that
because the irrigation system used by the landowner was the most
practical system available, the oil producer had to use an underground
pumping system, which was a reasonable alternative to the surface
mounted systems.' 5
The doctrine of alternative means has been applied in Louisiana
as well. In Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co.," the lessor's pipeline
operations allegedly interfered with the lessee's seismic tests. The
plaintiff-lessee sought an injunction to have the pipeline operations
shut down so as not to interfere with the testing. The court held that
any grant of relief would unduly interfere with the landowner's right
to reasonably use the property. The court found that there was a
location that was not on the defendant's property where the plain-
tiffs seismic tests could be conducted; this location would adequately
serve the plaintiff's purpose. The new location was a reasonable alter-
native means that would allow both the lessor and the lessee to con-
duct operations on the leased premises.
mond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976), in which the North Dakota and Utah
Supreme Courts, respectively, adopted the doctrine of accommodation as set forth in
Getty Oil. For cases applying the principle of accommodation even before Getty Oil,
see Harris v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 385 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1967); Jenkins v. Depoyster,
299 Ky. 500, 186 S.W.2d 14 (1945); Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967).
45. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972), handed down almost a
year after Getty Oil, was a departure from the trend toward accommodation of the
surface owner. Sun Oil began pumping fresh water from beneath Whitaker's land for
secondary recovery operations. The court held that Sun Oil, the dominant estate, had
implied rights as lessee to any part of the surface that was reasonably necessary to
carry on his operations, even though this use might substantially deplete the value
of the surface estate.
In Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974), the Texas Supreme
Court clearly indicated that it was not abandoning the doctrine of accommodation.
West had attempted to btain an injunction preventing Humble Oil from injecting
extraneous gas into an underground reservoir. Humble Oil proved that this injection
was necessary to preserve the subsurface reservoir and was allowed to inject the
extraneous gas subject to West's mineral interest. In recognition of the doctrine of
accommodation, the court held that the rules of "reasonable accommodation" applied
when adjusting the correlative rights of mineral interest owners with respect to an
existing surface use. Id. at 815. Thus Sun Oil v. Whitaker did not mark the demise
of the accommodation doctrine. For further evidence of the continued trend toward
accommodation, see the cases cited at note 55, infra.
46. 260 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. La. 1966), aff'd, 387 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 400 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Exercising rights with reasonable regard means that parties with
competing mineral interests on the same land do not have absolute
freedom in locating their surface facilities or conducting operations. '
Thus the standard of reasonable regard promotes multiple land use.
A similar policy is reflected in the doctrine of accommodation.48
Accommodating another mineral lessee simply means that the par-
ties do not act unreasonably, a requirement which is nothing more
than the standard of reasonableness embodied in article 11 of the
Mineral Code. Indeed, the standard of reasonable regard arguably re-
quires a mineral lessee to accommodate any other party with an in-
terest in the land if there are reasonable alternative means that can
be implemented so as to allow both parties to conduct operations.
Therefore, the cases from Louisiana and those other jurisdictions that
apply the doctrine of accommodation provide some guidance for in-
terpretation and application of article l's standard of reasonable
regard.
Due Regard
In other jurisdictions, the mineral estate is regarded as dominant
over the surface estate.49 However, the mineral estate is required to
exercise its rights with due regard for the surface estate. In the past,
this meant that a mineral lessee had the right to use as much of the
surface as was reasonably necessary to recover the minerals. If the
lessee's use was reasonable, he was allowed to exercise his rights to
47. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 379 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981); see also Collette v. Marine Explora-
tion Co., 213 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. La. 1963).
48. See Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
49. The "dominant mineral owner" doctrine and its development are described
in 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS S 3.2 (1962); 3 C. LINDLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL LANDS WITHIN
THE PUBLIC LAND STATES AND TERRITORIES AND GOVERNING THE ACQUISITION AND EN-
JOYMENT OF MINING RIGHTS IN LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN S 813 (3d ed. 1914); 4 W.
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS S 652 (1962 & Supp. 1982); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §5 218 to 218.14 (1981 & Supp. 1982); Davis, Selected Prob-
lems Regarding Lessee's Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 8 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 315 (1963); Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use,
Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411
(1974); Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees Under Oil and Gas Leases to
Use and Occupy the Surface, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 227 (1975); Lambert, Sur-
face Rights of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1958); Patton, Recent
Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 19 (1973); Comment, Land Uses Permitted an Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 TEX. L.
REV. 889 (1959); Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 383 (1976).
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the exclusion of the owner of the surface estate.' Determining what
was reasonable and necessary, however, often proved difficult.'
Judicial definitions of reasonable necessity ranged from "less than im-
perative need" to "more than mere suitable convenience."52 When
making the determination, courts primarily looked to the mineral
lessee's interest. 3 The lessor had bargained for consideration, and in
return, he had granted the lessee a right to enter and use his land
as reasonably necessary. Therefore, the lessor bargained away his
right to complain that the lessee's use of the surface was excessive."
This inequality between the positions of the lessee and the lessor
was justified by the need to protect the emerging oil industry.
However, the oil industry is no longer in need of protection, and there
has been a shift in recent years toward accommodation of others with
interests in the land, reflecting the currently prevailing public policy
of promoting productive land use. As a result of this trend, a new
version of the due regard standard has developed. The modern ver-
sion of the due regard standard focuses on whether or not the mineral
lessee has unreasonably interfered with the existing uses of the sur-
face. For example, in the 1980 Texas Supreme Court case of Ball v.
Dillard,, a surface lessee prohibited access to a mineral lessee having
rights on the same property. The court held that the lessees were
subject to the rules of reasonable usage and neither party could in-
terfere with the operations of the other. The court recognized the
correlative rights doctrine, stating that "the rights of the surface
holder and the mineral estate holder are reciprocal and distinct."5
Thus a trend toward focusing on the rights of all parties with in-
terests in the land has emerged.
Louisiana's standard of reasonable regard, like the standard of
due regard, focuses on how much of the surface a mineral owner can
50. See Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967); General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex.
104, 344 S.W.2d 668 (1961); Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961).
51. See Browder, The Dominant Oil and Gas Estate-Master or Servant of the Ser-
vient Estate, 17 Sw. L.J. 25, 50 (1963).
52. Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 235, 4 So. 350, 354 (1888).
53. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 151.
54. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. 1972); Browder, supra
note 51, at 52.
55. See Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Winslow v. Duval
County Ranch Co., 519 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh,
283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976);
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 16 (1973).
56. 602 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1980).
57. Id. at 523.
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use without unduly interfering with use by another. 8 The concept of
reasonable regard embodies a true correlative right,59 for no natural
resource has absolute preeminence and all parties' use of the land
must be accommodated."0 Thus the reasonable regard standard and
the modern approach to applying due regard seem consonant. Under
both standards, a mineral lessee does not have unrestricted use of
the surface and he must not unreasonably interfere with others who
have interests in the land. Therefore, those cases that apply the due
regard standard and reflect the emerging concept of correlative rights
may be looked to for guidance when interpreting the reasonable regard
standard.61
Avoiding Conflicts
Coexisting mineral lessees should agree as to how operations are
to be conducted and the costs of any inconvenience are to be borne.
A plan should be formulated to avoid the conflicts that inevitably will
arise when lessees attempt to produce their minerals concurrently.
For example, specific locations of mineral operations and access routes
can be determined in advance. One mineral lessee may agree to delay
his activities on a piece of property while the other conducts his opera-
tions; such an agreement would be particularly effective where one
of the competing mineral interests is in the lignite deposits on the
property and the other is in the oil and gas deposits in the strata
below.
58. See Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1959); Doucet v. Texas
Co., 205 La. 312, 318, 17 So. 2d 340, 341 (1944); Lauzon v. J.C. Trahan Drilling Contrac-
tor, Inc., 247 So. 2d 236, 240 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d
430, 431-32 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
59. There is a line of Louisiana cases that apply the older interpretation of the
due regard standard. See Collette v. Marine Exploration Co., 213 F. Supp. 609, 611
(E.D. La. 1963); Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 379 So. 2d 1117, 1130-31 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981); Hawthorne Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 368 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
377 So. 2d 285 (La. 1979); Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1958). However, the inclusion of the reasonable regard standard in the
Mineral Code indicates an intent to codify the line of cases which indicate that a true
correlative right exists between concurrent users of land. See cases cited in note 58,
supra.
60. Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1959).
61. There is one caveat in using the due regard standard as an aid in interpreting
the reasonable regard standard. In Texas, where the due regard standard is used,
if there is only one manner of use of the surface the mineral lessee has the right
to pursue this use, regardless of surface damage. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d
618 (Tex. 1971); Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
This may not be true in Louisiana in light of the incorporation of the correlative rights
doctrine in article 11 of the Mineral Code.
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In such a situation, when deciding which lessee should wait, the
parties should consider certain factors. For example, consideration
must be given to the feasibility of finding another location upon which
a profitable oil well can be drilled without interfering with lignite
production, the possibility of strip mining in another area of the unit
until oil is produced from a well, the effect of postponement of the
lessee's operations (his lease may expire if arrangements are not made
for an extension), and the lessee's responsibility to the landowner for
delay rentals during any period of nonproduction. Because owners of
mineral interests must be provided a right of passage to their drill-
ing and mining operations, access routes must be available to an oil
well located in an area to be strip mined. If in building a road to
a well the route is longer than would have been taken otherwise, the
parties should consider who should bear the additional cost.
If strip mining is to occur in an area where there is an existing
oil well, a layer of insulating coal must be left around the shaft of
the oil well and its pipelines to protect them from the vibrations that
occur with the mining of the lignite.2 When determining whether
mining the area will be profitable, the lignite producer should assess
the value of the lignite that must be left unmined to protect the oil
well. If these costs are great, it may be more economical for the lignite
producer to buy the working oil operation and discontinue its produc-
tion so that the entire area can be strip mined. However, unless oil
production is feasible after strip mining is completed,"3 this solution
is unsatisfactory because it does not encourage maximum development
of all energy resources. In any case, oil and gas exploration and
development often can be scheduled to precede the beginning of mining
or can be delayed until the surface acreage has been leveled after
62. Other states have statutes that contain specific requirements that must be
met before any oil well is drilled in an area which is known to be underlaid with
coal-bearing strata. Kentucky requires that casing insulate an oil well which penetrates
a workable coal bed. The purpose of the casing is to protect the oil operations from
vibrations that occur with the mining of the coal. The casing must be seated at least
thirty feet below the bed in twenty feet of cement, mud, clay, or nonporous material
that will make strip mining of the beds above and below this seating possible. When
the oil well is drilled below the workable coal bed, the shaft must be of a size suffi-
cient to permit a liner to be inserted around the casing; this liner also will be seated
in cement. Following the setting of the liner, the oil producer may begin drilling. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. S 353.080 (Baldwin 1978). Similar requirements should be enacted in
Louisiana to avoid the dangers inherent in coexisting mineral operations. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, SS 2204-2206 (Purdon 1982); W. VA. CODE SS 22-4-5 to 22-4-12 (1981).
63. There is some question as to whether or not it is technologically possible to
temporarily plug an oil or gas well in a manner that will permit resumption of the
oil or gas operations after strip mining.
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mining. Peaceful coexistence of conflicting mineral interests is possi-
ble in most cases if the parties recognize areas of conflict and reach
mutually beneficial compromises.
The Commissioner's Role
If an agreement regarding the mineral interests cannot be reached,
the parties should seek resolution of their conflicts by looking to the
Commissioner of Conservation." The Commissioner has jurisdiction
over all persons and property necessary to enforce effectively title
30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes."5 Originally concerning only oil
and gas, title 30 has been expanded to give the Commissioner
authority over lignite." His power includes the authority to make
reasonable rules, regulations, and orders pertaining both to the con-
servation of oil and gas and to surface coal mining and reclamation.
More specifically, the Commissioner has jurisdiction over all natural
resources in the state, except those expressly regulated by other
departments. 8 He is given authority to prevent wells from being
drilled, operated, and produced in a manner causing injury to neighbor-
ing leases or property. 9 Furthermore, the Surface Reclamation Act
gives the Commissioner authority to prevent, by all practicable and
economically feasible methods, the wasteful use of lignite.0
64. Under N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-15-03 (1980), the industrial commission has
authority to make investigations that it deems proper in order to determine whether
facts exist justifying action on its part. It also has the authority to resolve conflicting
interests of producers of natural resources in order to eliminate waste and ensure
that the producer, landowner, and mineral owner realize the greatest possible economic
advantage. It can require the furnishing of a reasonable bond to ensure compliance
with governing rules and regulations of the commission. The commission has the power
to hold hearings and make emergency rules when necessary. West Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania give to their equivalent of the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation the power
to make such determinations. W. VA. CODE SS 22-4-2 to 22-4-12 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52, SS 2204-2206 (Purdon 1982).
KY. REV. STAT. S 353.060 (1978) requires a hearing before the Department of
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Kentucky's equivalent to Louisiana's
Office of Conservation, if the drilling of an oil or gas well on any tract underlaid with
coal-bearing strata will endanger the present or future use or operation of a workable
coal bed. At the hearing, the well operator and the coal operator or owner consider
the objections and either agree upon the location of the well as proposed or change
it so as to satisfy all objections and meet the approval of the Department. If an agree-
ment cannot be reached, the Department fixes a new site for the well on a tract near
the location originally proposed by the well operator.
65. LA. R.S. 30:4(A) (1950).
66. LA. R.S. 30:901-32 (Supp. 1976 & 1978).
67. LA. R.S. 30:4(C) (1950); LA. R.S. 30:905(B)(2), (5), (11) (Supp. 1976).
68. LA. R.S. 30:1(C) (1950).
69. LA. R.S. 30:4(C)(3) (1950).
70. LA. R.S. 30:905(B)(2) (Supp. 1978).
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Evidently, the Commissioner has the authority both to resolve
conflicts between lignite producers and oil producers and to assess
the rights of all parties in order to develop all natural resources effi-
ciently. This authority is implied, however, and a more specific delega-
tion of power may be desirable, as was noticed by the Continuous
Revision Committee for the Mineral Code in a report submitted during
April of 1981. The Committee stated:
Although the conflicts between different owners of mineral
rights are capable of resolution in the setting of a court, the highly
technical nature of the problems and the need for expertise in
evaluating alternatives make such a matter more appropriate for
handling by an administrative agency. Indeed, there is the fur-
ther aspect of the situation that the state has special interest in
the development and conservation of natural resources that a court
trying to resolve a controversy between two private parties may
not be able to give adequate attention to. Likewise, an agency
can proceed through rule making procedures as well as by ad-
judication and generally can act more expeditiously and efficient-
ly, and with a greater degree of uniformity than can the courts.
Such factors are of considerable importance in facilitating planning
of development by all parties, including the state and those who
will consume the energy produced. It would be desirable to
empower the Commissioner of Conservation to regulate mineral
development operations with a view towards prevention of waste
and promotion of conservation of different resources."
In addition to defining more explicitly the powers of the Commis-
sioner, the enactment of several additional statutes is imperative
to ensure peaceful cohabitation by owners of conflicting mineral in-
terests. For example, provisions should be enacted setting forth the
precautious to follow when drilling an oil well through coal-bearing
strata."2 In addition, a statute similar to the federal multiple use
statute"3 should be enacted to provide that upon the request of a party
conducting either drilling or mining operations, the mineral lessee who
already has begun operations shall furnish to the requesting party
(at his expense) information as to the sites of any workings or facilities
on the land. Access to the area of mining or drilling should be allowed
at reasonable times so the parties can survey the operation sites. If
damage results from a failure to comply with the request, the re-
71. Martin, supra note 3, at 6.
72. See note 62, supra.
73. 30 U.S.C. S 526 (1976).
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questing party should be relieved of liability for this damage and
should recover court costs and attorney's fees necessary to enforce
compliance with the statute.
Conclusion
Peaceful coexistence of competing mineral interests is possible if
the parties recognize areas of conflict and reach agreement as to loca-
tions of operations and access routes before operations begin. Mineral
lessees have a right to do whatever is reasonable and necessary in
conducting their operations, but this right must be exercised with
reasonable regard for other users.
In cases of conflict, the Commissioner of Conservation should be
authorized to determine and regulate the rights of competing mineral
interest owners. In so doing, he should employ the standard of
reasonableness embodied in articles 11 and 22 of the Mineral Code.
The doctrine of accommodation, the standard of due regard, and Loui-
siana Civil Code article 667 may provide additional guidance when
determining what conduct is reasonable. By using a standard of
reasonableness, factors such as the present demand for energy
resources, the determination as to which lessee is in the best posi-
tion to postpone his operations, and the actions by the mineral lessees
that are necessary to develop the leased interests may be considered.
The primary concern of all parties should be to encourage and pro-
mote the production of all natural resources in a manner that will
prevent waste and allow the greatest ultimate recovery.
Lisa Diane Conly
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